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The introduction of political factors into the traditionalﬁscal federal-
ismmodels is the distinctive feature of the so-called second generation
theory of ﬁscal federalism (Oates, 2005; but also Weingast, 2009). Fol-
lowing this line of research, in this paper we re-examine the issue of
vertical tax externalities in a federation (Flowers, 1988; Wrede, 1996;
Boadway and Keen, 1996; Keen, 1998; Boadway et al., 1998; Keen and
Kotsogiannis, 2002, 2003; Dahlby and Wilson, 2003) by adding to the
analysis the possibility that special interest groups lobby the policy
makers with the aim of inﬂuencing tax policy towards their own
objectives.3conomia e Culture, Università
+39 031 3305814; fax: +39
),
o.rizzo@unife.it (L. Rizzo).
Facultat d.Economia i Empresa,
90, 08034-Barcelona, Spain.
ità di Ferrara, Via Voltapaletto
l tax competition among U.S.
o and Wilson (2010). Our ap-
competition.
rights reserved.The analysis is framed in the context of excise taxes,which are speciﬁc
indirect taxes levied on tobacco products, mineral oil products and alco-
holic beverages. In fact, excise taxation represents a natural setup for ex-
amining the interaction between vertical tax externalities and lobbying.
In some federal countries, such as theUS andCanada, excise taxes are lev-
ied by different layers of government.4 It is also evident that tax policy in
this area is subjected to the inﬂuence of powerful interest groups. On one
side, the companies operating in the tobacco and in the oil sectors have
strong incentives to lobby the policy makers at all levels to keep the tax-
ation of their products as low as possible, because taxation has a negative
impact on their proﬁts. On the other side, there are inﬂuential non-proﬁt
organizations that lobby for higher taxation of products that are deemed
harmful for the environment and for individual and public health.
Our theoretical analysis is also rooted on what happens in practice
in countries like the US, in which special interest groups can transpar-
ently offer ﬁnancial contributions to political parties and candidates.
As reported by the Center for Responsive Politics, the lobbying activity
of ﬁrms in the tobacco and in the oil and gas industries is very impor-
tant at the federal level: in the 11 election cycles running from 1990
to 2010, campaign contributions to federal candidates and political4 For empirical analysis on vertical and/or horizontal interactions in cigarettes and
gasoline taxation in the US or Canada, see Besley and Rosen (1998), Rork (2003),
Devereux et al. (2007), Fredriksson and Mamun (2008), Rizzo (2008, 2010), Esteller-
Moré and Rizzo (2011).
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$63 million from the tobacco industry.5 In addition to campaign con-
tributions to candidates and political parties, these companies devote
considerable ﬁnancial resources to lobby Congress and federal agen-
cies by means of lobbying ﬁrms or in-house lobbyists. From 1998 to
2010, lobbying expenditures amounted to $1003 billion for the oil
and gas industry and to $309 million for the tobacco industry.6 Inter-
estingly, four important clients (i.e., companies hiring an outside
group to perform lobbying activities) of the oil and gas industry
(Exxon Mobil, Chevron Corp, Koch Industries, American Petroleum
Institute) overall reported that in 2009 their lobbying activity was re-
lated to ‘taxation’ issues in 68 cases. In the same year, lobbying by
Altria group, the biggest client in the tobacco industry, occurred 37
times on taxation issues.7 At the state level, Moore (2007) reports
that from 2003 through 2006 the oil and gas, electric utilities and
coal mining industries contributed $58.3 million to candidates and
party committees. From 2000 to 2010, total contributions to all candi-
dates and committees at the state-level equalled $270.6 million for
the oil and gas industry and $0.498 million for the tobacco industry.8
Givel and Glantz (2001), and Morley et al. (2002), by closely examin-
ing documents and lobbying expenditures of the Tobacco Institute,9
ﬁnd that in the 1990s its efforts to lobby US state legislatures included
the objective of minimizing tax increases, and that spending was
higher in states with higher taxation rates on cigarettes. Also anti-
tobacco and environmental groups are very active in lobbying policy
makers at all levels, although with much smaller ﬁnancial resources
than those available to the industries companies. During the period
1989–2010, contributions by environmental organizations totalled
about $57 million, 76% of which at the federal level and the rest at
the state level. In the period 1998–2010, lobbying expenditures on
behalf of the environment amounted to more than $154 million.10
The Campaign for tobacco free kids organization spent only $24,580
on campaign contributions in the period 1999–2008, but devoted
more than $4 million on lobbying expenditures from 1997 to 2010.11
In our theoretical analysis, we consider a federation composed of an
upper level (federal) and a lower level (state) of government. Since we
are not interested in analyzing the impact on tax policy of direct interac-
tions among sub-national governments due to tax-base mobility, we as-
sume,without loss of generality, that there is only one state government.
Depending on the institutional setting, either both layers of government,
or only one of the two, could be allowed to levy an excise tax on an
externality-generating consumers’ good that is produced in an imper-
fectly competitive market. In both tax regimes, two types of pressure
groups seek to inﬂuence tax policy by offering the policy makers mone-
tary contributions for the ﬁnance of electoral campaigns: a group repre-
senting ﬁrms interest for high proﬁts, and a group representing citizens
interest for low consumption externalities. As for policy makers, they
are assumed to care both for tax revenue collected (i.e., Leviathan behav-
ior) and for campaign contributions cashed from the lobbies.
As the traditional literature has shown, the sharing of an elastic tax
base by two layers of government generally leads to an excessively
high level of taxation. This is not necessarily true in our framework,
since tax policy is driven by Leviathan behavior in a market with two
sources of inefﬁciency: imperfect competition and a consumption5 http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2010&ind=E01 for the
oil and gas industry, A02 for the tobacco industry. (This web page, like those quoted
in footnotes 6–8, were accessed on September 7, 2010).
6 http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i.
7 http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/issuesum.php?year=2009&Iname=Taxes&id=.
8 http://www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&i%5B%5D=33.
9 The Tobacco Institute, which was disbanded in 1998, was an industry trade organi-
zation governed and funded by US tobacco manufacturers.
10 http://inﬂuenceexplorer.com/industry/environment/72c7c89ba4ce406d9915210
5c08ccedf (accessed on May 31, 2011).
11 http://inﬂuenceexplorer.com/organization/campaign-for-tobacco-free-kids/f79ef506bb
d34c25b7e6af8f966d1dae (accessed on May 31, 2011).externality. Our purpose is then twofold. The ﬁrst is to characterize
the conditions under which, in a given tax regime, tax policy subjected
to lobbying determines a Pareto improvement over the corresponding
tax policy in its absence. The second goal is the comparison, in the
presence of lobbying, of taxation by a single layer of government with
taxation by both layers, in order to identify whether the dispersion of
taxing powersmay improve efﬁciency. To address these issues, we pro-
ceed by analyzing ﬁrst the case in which there is a single lobby group,
that of producers, and then by extending the model by introducing a
second lobby group with conﬂicting interests.
None of the players are hurt by lobbyingwhen there is a single pres-
sure group.While producers take advantage from lobbying in all tax re-
gimes, policy makers take advantage as well only when both layers of
government are allowed to tax. When only one layer of government is
allowed to tax, the policy maker neither loses nor gains from being lob-
bied. Vertical tax externalities explain the different outcomes for policy
makers in the two tax regimes. The picture is different when there is a
second lobby group with opposed interests to the ﬁrst one. In this
case, policy makers take advantage from the ﬁght undertaken by the
two lobby groups to win their favors, also when taxation is in the
hands of a single taxing authority. The more distant are the objectives
of the lobby groups, the larger is the gain for policy makers. As a result,
there are no circumstances inwhichboth groups gain from lobbying. Ei-
ther one of the two gains while the other one loses, or both lose.
In the one lobby group case, we also examine how the timing of
tax setting and lobbying inﬂuences the outcomes under tax-base
overlapping. This leads to the comparison of three tax regimes: taxa-
tion by a single layer of government, simultaneous taxation by both
layers, and sequential taxation by both layers. We ﬁnd that the
lobby of producers always prefers to deal with a single policy
maker. Instead, the preferred tax regime by policy makers depends
on the market structure of the taxed good. If the market is concentrat-
ed, it is better for policy makers to spread the taxing power between
the two layers of government, because producers are strong lobbyists.
If, instead, the market is sufﬁciently competitive, which implies that
producers have weak incentives to lobby, politicians are better off
when the taxing power is on a single level of government.
Lobbying by special interest groups has already made its appearance
in the theoretical literature on ﬁscal federalism, though focusing on dif-
ferent issues than the one studied in this paper. Persson (1998) examines
the impact of lobbying on the provision of local public goods that are ﬁ-
nanced out of a common pool of resources. Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2000) study how lobbying by special interest groups may inﬂuence
the outcomes of local elections. Bordignon et al. (2008), Ruta (2010)
and Redoano (2010) focus on the role of lobbying on the choice between
centralization and decentralization of public policies. Brusco et al. (2010)
examine how taxpayers’ lobbying affects the optimal degree of tax au-
tonomy that should be granted to a local government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the
model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium tax policies in the presence
of a single lobby group. Tax regimes are compared in Section 4. Themodel
is extended in Section 5 with the introduction a second lobby group.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs of Propositions 1–3
and an outline of the proofs of Proposition 4 and of Results 1–5; the com-
plete proofs are in Appendix B (in the Supplementary material).
2. The framework
Consider a federation composed of the central (or federal) govern-
ment and one regional (or state) government. Both layers of govern-
ment might be entitled to levy an excise tax on a consumption good
that is produced in an oligopolistic market.12 Both the federal and12 In terms of tax incidence, speciﬁc (or excise, or unit ) taxes are not equivalent to ad
valorem taxes in imperfectly competitive markets (see, e.g. Myles, 1995, chapter 11, for
a throughout survey). We explained in the Introduction why we focus on excise taxes.
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of maximizing their own tax revenue, without taking into account
the impact of their actions on the tax revenue of the other policy
maker. However, Leviathan behavior might be distorted by the lobby-
ing activity of special interest groups, since the policy makers may be
ready to give up part of their tax revenues in exchange of monetary
transfers, in the form of campaign contributions, from the lobbyists.
We consider two institutional regimes: one in which only one layer
of government is allowed to tax, and the other one in which both layers
of government have the power to tax. In the latter case, regarding the
timing of tax setting, we examine both the case in which tax decisions
are simultaneous and the case in which the federal policy maker is a
Stackelberg leader, setting her own tax rate beforehand the state policy
maker makes her own choice. While an important part of the literature
holds that sequential tax setting represents the most interesting and
most plausible approach, there are at least three reasons to focus also
on simultaneous tax setting. Firstly, there is no compelling empirical ev-
idence in support of one view over the other one.13 Secondly, simulta-
neous tax setting represents the intermediate case between the
regime with a single taxing authority and the one with two taxing au-
thorities thatmake sequential decisions. Finally, in the context of lobby-
ing the timing of tax decisions may be inﬂuenced also by the pressure
group that acts as a principal in the lobby game.14
Theworking of the economy follows a two-stage process. In the ﬁrst
one, tax policy is determined. In the second stage, the market equilibri-
um is determined, given the tax rates set at the previous stage. The
model is solved backward. We thus start from the ﬁnal stage and
solve for the market equilibrium.
2.1. The imperfectly competitive market
We model an imperfectly competitive market in a partial equilibri-
um framework. The number of ﬁrms,m≥1, is ﬁxed (themodel encom-
passes a monopoly market as a limit case for m=1). We also assume
that all ﬁrms are identical, selling an homogeneous good and producing
at constant marginal (and average) costs c∈(0, 1) (there are no ﬁxed
costs). The aggregate demand takes a linear form, Q=1−p, where Q
is aggregate consumption and p is the consumer's price.15
Let T and t be the speciﬁc tax rates levied, respectively by the federal
and the state government, on ﬁrms’ sales. Let qj be the quantity pro-
duced and sold by ﬁrm j, so that∑ j=1m qj=Q. Firm j's proﬁts are then
deﬁned as:
Πj ¼ p−c−T−tð Þqj: ð1Þ
Firms compete à la Cournot by setting simultaneously and inde-
pendently their own quantity sold. By differentiating Eq. (1) with re-
spect to qj, subject to p=1−Q, Q=∑ k=1m qk, the necessary ﬁrst
order condition for proﬁt maximization by ﬁrm j can be written as16:
α−T−t−∑
k≠j
qk−2qj ¼ 0; j ¼ 1;…;m; ð2Þ13 Hayashi and Boadway (2001), for instance, estimate the tax-setting functions of
the federal and the provincial governments in Canada, where both layers tax business
income, arriving at the conclusion that they “are unsure of the choice between the
Nash and the Stackelberg models” (p. 500).
14 We do not endogenize the timing of tax decisions, and we simply compare simul-
taneous with sequential tax setting. In a recent theoretical work on horizontal tax com-
petition, Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) endogenize the timing of the tax-setting
decisions of the competing jurisdictions.
15 A more general speciﬁcation of a linear demand would be Q=b(a−p), with a>0
and b>0 demand parameters. However, since all the results do not depend on the
values taken by a and b, we assume, without loss of generality, that a=b=1.
16 Under the given hypotheses (linear demand and linear production costs) the nec-
essary ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are also sufﬁcient. Moreover,
Stern's (1987) stability condition of the market equilibrium is also satisﬁed.where we deﬁne α=1−c>0 to simplify the notation. By summing
Eq. (2) over j=1,…, m, one gets m(α−T− t)−(1+m)Q=0. From
the latter equation we then obtain the equilibrium aggregate quantity
as a function of the relevant tax rates:
Q T ; tð Þ ¼ m 1þmð Þ−1 α−T−tð Þ: ð3Þ
Notice that the equilibrium is symmetric, since we are assuming
identical ﬁrms, with qj(T, t)=m−1Q(T, t), j=1,…, m. We restrict
the analysis to market equilibria such that α>T+ t, in order to ensure
that Q(T, t)>0.17 Finally, by substituting Q(T, t) into p=1−Q we get
the equilibrium consumers’ price, p(T, t).
2.2. Economic agents and their payoffs
There are three types of agents holding stakes in the market de-
scribed above: policy makers, producers and consumers. In this sec-
tion we deﬁne their payoffs and objective functions.
As for producers, by aggregating Πj in Eq. (1) over j=1,…, m and
then substituting for p(T, t) and Q(T, t), we compute aggregate ﬁrms’
proﬁts (net of excise taxes, but gross of contributions spent on lobby-
ing activity):
Π T ; tð Þ ¼ m 1þmð Þ−2 α−T−tð Þ2: ð4Þ
Proﬁts are decreasing in the number of ﬁrms m and tend asymp-
totically to zero for m→∞. Moreover, with a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms
an increase of either tax rates reduces proﬁts, with an impact that is
stronger the lower is m. Therefore, ﬁrms have an incentive to lobby
the policy makers for tax rates reductions.18 Concerning lobbying be-
havior, the assumption we make is that of full cooperation among
ﬁrms: while competing in their product market, ﬁrms act as a single
body when making pressure on policy makers for tax rates cuts.
This is likely to be the case, for instance, when producers deal with
other economic institutions (e.g., trade unions, consumers’ organiza-
tions, politicians, bureaucrats) by means of an association represent-
ing their interests. Net of contributions to policy makers, ﬁrms
aggregate proﬁts are equal to:
π T; t; Z; zð Þ ¼ Π T; tð Þ− Z þ zð Þ; ð5Þ
where Z≥0 and z≥0 are the contributions offered to the federal and
the state policy makers, respectively. Since ﬁrms are identical, it is as-
sumed that the cost of monetary contributions is equally shared
among them.
Turning to policy makers, we assume, as in Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2003), that they are interested only in maximizing their private con-
sumption, and that for this purpose they are able to divert a fraction
x∈(0, 1), exogenously given, of public resources, i.e., tax revenues
plus contributions from the lobby; we specify below the destination
of the remaining fraction, 1−x, of public resources.19 These assump-
tions imply that politicians aim at maximizing tax revenues plus17 In what follows, we will not return to this existence condition since it is immediate
to verify that the equilibrium tax rates (both in the absence and in the presence of lob-
bying) are such that Q>0 for all α∈(0, 1).
18 The literature on tax incidence (e.g., Seade, 1985) has shown that in oligopoly spe-
ciﬁc commodity taxation may increase proﬁts, a fact that would give the producers an
incentive to lobby for higher tax rates. However, proﬁtable tax increases come about
only when the demand curve is ‘highly convex’, which is a rather special and empiri-
cally implausible occurrence (see, for instance, Anderson et al., 2001, p. 185).
19 For the sake of simplicity, we have assumed that politicians are able to divert for
private purposes the same fraction x of tax revenues and political contributions, al-
though a natural alternative would be to assume that contributions can be diverted
more easily than tax revenues. Moreover, the amount of resources grabbed by policy
makers could be made endogenous, like in Edwards and Keen (1996) or in Persson
et al. (1997). However, in our setup this kind of generalizations would greatly compli-
cate the analysis.
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the federal and the state policy makers are given by:
V T; t; Zð Þ ¼ R T; tð Þ þ Z; ð6Þ
v T; t; zð Þ ¼ r T ; tð Þ þ z; ð7Þ
where R(.) and r(.) are the federal and the state tax revenues, respec-
tively. Using the expression for Q(T, t) in Eq. (3), the formulae for tax
revenues are:
R T; tð Þ ¼ Q T; tð ÞT ¼ m 1þmð Þ−1 α−T−tð ÞT ; ð8Þ
r T; tð Þ ¼ Q T; tð Þt ¼ m 1þmð Þ−1 α−T−tð Þt: ð9Þ
These revenue functions show that in the case of a single taxing
authority it is irrelevant whether the power to tax is given to the fed-
eral or to the state government, since federal and state taxation are
perfect substitutes in revenue terms. Therefore in what follows we as-
sume, without loss of generality, that in the case of a single taxing au-
thority the power to tax is given to the state government.
We ﬁnally turn to consumers. Given the linearity of demand, the
gross consumers’ surplus is a quadratic function of the quantity con-
sumed.20 We also follow O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), and assume
that the taxed good is a ‘sin’, or ‘harmful’, good, the consumption of
which causes a negative externality that consumers do not internalize
when taking their consumption decisions. Formally, we assume that
the externality E is linear in the quantity consumed,
E T ; tð Þ ¼ εαQ T; tð Þ; ð10Þ
so that the net consumers’ surplus (inclusive of the externality) is
equal to:
S T; tð Þ ¼ 1−Q T; tð Þ=2ð ÞQ T ; tð Þ−p T; tð ÞQ T; tð Þ−E T ; tð Þ: ð11Þ
The index ε∈ [0, 1] provides a measure, in percentage terms, of
how much important is the externality with reference to α, that has
been deﬁned above as equal to α=1−c. At one extreme, there is
no externality if ε=0. At the other end, the externality is very large
if ε=1, implying that the efﬁcient level of consumption is zero (see
Subsection 2.3 below).
There are two interpretations for the externality that are relevant in
the context of excise taxation. The ﬁrst refers to tobacco consumption.
The decision to smoke a cigarette today is likely to cause a health
harm in the future and smokers, acting in a time inconsistent manner,
internalize only partially the level of harm and therefore overconsume
the harmful good. In terms of our model, the part of future costs that
are internalized into today consumption decisions are included into
the gross consumers’ surplus, whereas the remaining part that is not in-
ternalized is represented by the externality (Eq. 10). O'Donoghue and
Rabin (2006) provide a precise intertemporal derivation of this kind
model for a generic ‘sin’ good,while Gruber and Kőszegi (2004) develop
a more articulated model focused on cigarette consumption, in which
the current level of health harm depends on the entire pattern of past
consumption levels. In the context of tobacco, each individual smoker
causes a negative externality on his or her future self. In the second,
and more classical, interpretation for the externality, each individual
consumer causes a negative externality on all other consumers; the20 The implicit assumption is that the utility function is quadratic in the taxed good
and linear in another consumption good that is exchanged in a competitive market.
Both its marginal utility (constant) and its market price are normalized to one. This im-
plies that there are no income effects on the demand for the taxed good and that the
consumer surplus is money-metric. We also assume, to avoid unnecessary complica-
tions, that the population is composed of identical individuals, and that all its members
are consumers, so that Q=1−p represents both the individual demand of a typical
consumer and the aggregate demand of a population with unit mass.typical example is motor fuel consumption, that causes pollution and
congestion costs. In both cases, taxation can play a useful role in limiting
the excessive consumption of the harmful good.
In addition to the net surplus deﬁned in Eq. (11), the consumers’
payoff is affected by the share, 1−x, of public resources that policy
makers are unable to divert for their private use. While tax revenues
are used to provide public goods (or to reduce other sources of reve-
nue), political contributions are used to ﬁnance electoral campaigns,
political rallies, and all other kind of party activities. Both types of ex-
penditures then beneﬁt citizens at large. However, instead of fully spec-
ifying the way in which these expenditures affect citizens’ welfare, we
opt for a ‘neutral’ position by assuming that these resources accrue to
consumers in the form of a uniform lump sum transfer. In this way,
we can isolate the impact of lobbying on the incentives of policymakers
on the resource-collection side of political activity, which is the main
focus of our analysis. Formally, the transfer is equal to21:
L T; t; Z; zð Þ ¼ 1−xð Þ R T ; tð Þ þ Z þ r T ; tð Þ þ zð Þ: ð12Þ
In total, consumers’ payoff is thus equal to S(.)+L(.).
2.3. Efﬁcient taxation
In the economy described above there are two sources of inefﬁcien-
cy. One is due to the externality, which causes excessive consumption.
The other source of inefﬁciency is due to market power that instead
pulls for sub-optimal levels of consumption. Tax policy can be used to
correct for market failure but policy makers, that are motivated by a Le-
viathan objective, do not intentionally address either source of inefﬁ-
ciency, and therefore tax policy is not, in general, efﬁcient.
As a benchmark for future reference, we thus conclude the presenta-
tion of the model by computing the efﬁcient tax policy. Recalling that c
represents the unit (andmarginal) cost of production of the taxed good,
the efﬁcient level of consumption is obtained by maximizing, with re-
spect to Q, the gross consumers’ surplus, inclusive of the externality,
minus production costs:
Ω Qð Þ ¼ 1−Q=2ð ÞQ−E Qð Þ−cQ : ð13Þ
Note that the function Ω(Q) is equal to the aggregate surplus of all
the economic agents described in Subsection 2.2. The efﬁcient con-
sumption is QEff=(1−ε)α. It is then immediate to see, by solving
the equation Q(T, t)=QEff with respect to (t+T), that the consolidat-
ed efﬁcient tax rate is equal to:
t þ Tð ÞEff ¼ αε−α 1−εð Þ=m: ð14Þ
The efﬁcient tax (or subsidy) is composed of two terms of opposite
sign. The positive term is equal to the externality per unit of consump-
tion; this term represents a classical Pigouvian-type corrective-tax. The
negative term is related to market structure and provides a subsidy to
correct for market power, since ﬁrms set the price above marginal cost.
3. Producers lobby for tax rates cuts
We are now ready to examine what happens when the producers
exert pressure on policymakers in order to obtain amore favorable tax-
ation of their sales. We assume that the lobbying activity takes a ‘legal’
and ‘public’ form, in which the producers’ association makes monetary
offers to policy makers (in the form of campaign contributions, for in-
stance) conditional on tax rates cuts. This ‘buying inﬂuence’ approach
for modelling lobbying behavior has been popularized in the context21 In principle, also ﬁrms’ net proﬁts accrue to consumers. However, we prefer to as-
sume that proﬁts accrue to a small group of individuals that we label ‘producers’ and
that we keep separated from the group of ‘consumers’.
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(1997) and Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), building on previous
work by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b). We apply the com-
mon agency framework in Section 5, where we consider two lobbying
groups. Herewe appeal to themodel developed by Segal (1999) that, al-
though not focusing explicitly on lobbying activities, is cast in terms of a
single principal contracting with many agents.22
We ﬁrst solve the lobby game in the case of sequential tax setting by
the two layers of government. We then examine the case of simulta-
neous tax settingwith lobbying. Finally, we consider the case of a single
taxing authority. As a benchmark for comparisons, in all cases we also
compute the equilibrium tax policy in the absence of lobbying. We
will use the superscripts ‘IIs’ and ‘IIn’ to denote an equilibrium with
two taxing authorities, respectively under sequential (or Stackelberg)
and simultaneous (or Nash) tax setting. The superscript ‘I’ will denote
an equilibrium under a single taxing authority. Subscript ‘0’will denote
an equilibrium in the absence of lobbying,whereas the absence of a sub-
script will denote an equilibrium with lobbying.
3.1. Sequential tax setting with lobbying
Following the timing of tax setting decisions, the lobbying activity
proceeds along two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the association of pro-
ducers lobbies the federal policy maker, anticipating the reaction of
the state policy maker to federal tax setting as inﬂuenced by lobbying.
In the second stage, producers lobby the state policy maker. Within
each lobbying stage, producers move ﬁrst by offering campaign con-
tributions to the policy maker in exchange for a particular tax rate,
and policy makers move second by accepting or rejecting the offer.
Each lobby game is solved backward.
Consider ﬁrst the lobby game between the producers and the state
policy maker. Following Segal (1999), we set up a two-stage game. In
the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrms association (the principal) credibly sends an
‘offer’ (t*, z*) to the state policy maker (the agent). We assume, as in
Segal (1999, Section III), that this offer is publicly observed.23 In the sec-
ond stage, the policy maker decides whether to accept or reject the
offer. If the policymaker accepts the offer, then she cashes the contribu-
tion and implements the tax rate ‘attached’ to the offer. Instead, if the
policy maker does not accept the offer, she is free to set the tax rate
that maximizes her own tax revenue because no contributions are
paid. Within this kind of game, we now characterize the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria that maximize the producers’ aggregate net
proﬁts.24
Formally, the producers’ association selects the offer (t*, z*) that
maximizes its net proﬁts (Eq. 5) subject to the state policy maker par-
ticipation constraint:
r T; tð Þ þ z ≥ r T; t Tð Þ½ ; ð15Þ
where t(T) is the best response function deﬁned by t(T)=argmaxtr(T, t).
The left-hand side of this inequality contains the objective function
(7) of the policy maker. The key point is the characterization, on the
right-hand side of the inequality, of the outside option of the policy
maker. Were the agent to reject the offer made by the principal, her22 Segal (1999) examines only the case in which the principal contracts simultaneously
with all the agents. We consider both simultaneous and sequential contracting.
23 Like in the literature quoted above, we assume that information is complete. Con-
cerning her offers to the agents, however, the principal can make either public offers
(Segal, Section III) or private offers (Segal, Section IV). We focus on a game with public
offers since in modern democracies only public contributions are legal. However, we
recognize that also the case of private offers could be of interest to model illegal lobby-
ing like bribery and corruption of politicians.
24 In general, this kind of games admits a multiplicity of equilibria. Following Segal
(1999), we thus focus on the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria that are preferred by
the principal. Moreover, given that in our model tax revenues and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
quadratic in the tax rates and linear in the contributions, the principal's preferred equi-
librium is always unique.payoff would include only the state tax revenue, that in turn depends
on the tax rate T set by the federal policy maker, as well as on his own
best response, t(T), to this tax rate. The outside option of the state policy
maker is therefore endogenous to the tax rate set by the other policy
maker.
Notice that the association of producers can always make a ‘trivial’
offer to the state policy maker, formally (t(T), 0), in which no contribu-
tions are offered in exchange for the tax rate t(T) that the state policy
maker would set in the absence of lobbying as a best response to a
given tax rate T set by the federal policy maker (perhaps under the inﬂu-
ence of the lobby). We can thus focus, without loss of generality, only on
the offers satisfying the participation constraint (15) and such that the
policy maker accepts the offer of the principal. Moreover, it is also imme-
diate to see that a proﬁt maximizing principal will make only offers such
that the participation constraint is binding: if the participation constraint
does not hold as an equality, the principal can always reduce the contribu-
tion to the agent without inducing her to reject the offer. These remarks
allow us to use the participation constraint (15), holding as equality, to
deﬁne the monetary contribution as a function of the tax rates:
z T; tð Þ ¼ r T ; t Tð Þ½ −r T ; tð Þ: ð16Þ
This contribution satisfying the policy maker's participation con-
straint is then plugged into the expression (5) for ﬁrms aggregate
net proﬁts, to get:
π T; t; Zð Þ ¼ Π T; tð Þ þ r T; tð Þ−r T; t Tð Þ½ −Z: ð17Þ
The ﬁrms’ association selects the tax rate to be included in the
offer made to the state policy maker by maximizing its net proﬁts
(17) with respect to t, for given T and Z. Denote the solution to this
maximization problem as t**(T).
We now turn to the lobby game between the producers’ associa-
tion and the federal policy maker. Firstly, we substitute t**(T) for t
into the federal tax revenue function (8) to get R[T, t**(T)]. By maxi-
mizing the resulting expression with respect to T, and denoting its so-
lution with T**, we obtain R[T**, t**(T**)], which is the outside option
(reservation utility) of the federal policy maker, i.e. the tax revenue
she would raise by refusing the offer of the lobby, but given that in
the subsequent lobbying stage the state policy maker accepts her
own offer from the principal. The participation constraint of the fed-
eral policy maker is thus written as:
R T; t Tð Þ þ Z ≥ R T; t T  : ð18Þ
By invoking the same arguments used in the analysis of the game
between the lobby and the state policy maker, the participation con-
straint (18) of the federal policy maker can be shown to hold as an
equality in equilibrium. This allows us to deﬁne from (18) the contri-
bution offered to the federal policy maker as:
Z Tð Þ ¼ R T; t T  −R T ; t Tð Þ : ð19Þ
Next, by substituting t**(T) for t, and Z(T) for Z, into Eq. (17), we
deﬁne the aggregate proﬁts of the lobby as a function of the federal
tax rate:
π Tð Þ ¼ Π T ; t Tð Þ½  þ R T ; t Tð Þ½ −R T; t Tð Þ½  þ
þr T; t Tð Þ½ −r T; t Tð Þ½ :
ð20Þ
The ﬁrms’ association selects the tax rate to be included in the
offer made to the federal policy maker by maximizing this expression
with respect to T. Denote the solution with TIIs. By substituting TIIs into
t**(T) we then ﬁnd the tax rate included in the offer made to the state
policy maker, tIIs= t**(TIIs). Finally, by substituting the equilibrium
tax rates into Eqs. (19) and (16), we ﬁnd the equilibrium monetary
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sented in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If both layers of government are entitled to tax and the as-
sociation of producers lobbies sequentially the policymakers (ﬁrst the federal
and then the state) for tax rates reductions, in the unique subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of the sequential lobby game the federal and the state tax
rates are equal to, respectively:
TIIs ¼ 2m
1þ 2m
α
2
 
; tIIs ¼ 2 1þmð Þ m−1ð Þ
1þ 2mð Þm
α
4
 
: ð21Þ
Contributions paid to the federal and the state policy makers are
equal to, respectively:
ZIIs ¼ α
2
8 1þ 2mð Þ2 ; z
IIs ¼ 1þmð Þα
2
4 1þ 2mð Þ2m :
ð22Þ
If there is no lobbying, and the federal policy maker is a Stackelberg
leader, in the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium the tax rates
are: T0
IIs=α/2, t0IIs=α/4.
As expected, the tax rates in the presence of lobbying by producers
are lower than the corresponding tax rates in its absence. The federal pol-
icy maker takes advantage of moving ﬁrst by setting a tax rate that is
greater than the one set by the state policy maker, both in the presence
and in the absence of lobbying. Market structure (i.e., the number of
ﬁrmsm) inﬂuences the equilibrium tax rates in the presence of lobbying
but not in its absence. A reduction in the number of ﬁrms, bymaking lob-
byingmore inﬂuential, causes a reduction of both tax rates. Proposition 1
also shows that zIIs>ZIIs: the contributions paid to the state policymaker
aremore generous than those paid to the federal policymaker. The result
is due to the fact that the lobbying activity at the federal level, by reduc-
ing TIIs and thus increasing the tax base, causes a positive externality on
the reservation utility of the state policy maker; hence it becomes more
costly to induce the state policy maker to reduce her tax rate.
3.2. Simultaneous tax setting with lobbying
Let T(t)=argmaxTR(T, t) and t(T)=argmaxtr(T, t). These best re-
sponse functions are used to deﬁne the reservation utilities and the par-
ticipation constraints of the policymakers; formally:R(T, t)+Z≥R[T(t), t]
and r(T, t)+z≥r[T, t(T)], respectively for the federal and the state policy
maker. By invoking the same arguments used above, these participation
constraints are binding in equilibrium. Therefore the contributions of-
fered to policy makers by producers are equal to Z(T, t)=R[T(t), t]−
R(T, t), z(T, t)=r[T, t(T)]−r(T, t). By substituting these expressions into
the net proﬁts function (5), the objective function of the producers’ asso-
ciation can be written as:
π T; tð Þ ¼ Π T; tð Þ þ R T; tð Þ þ r T; tð Þ−R T tð Þ; t½ −r T; t Tð Þ½ : ð23Þ
By maximizing this function with respect to the tax rates, we ob-
tain a symmetric solution that is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If both layers of government are entitled to tax and the as-
sociation of producers lobbies simultaneously the policy makers for tax
rates reductions, in the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the si-
multaneous lobby game the federal and the state tax rates are equal to:
TIIn ¼ tIIn ¼ 9m−3
9mþ 1
α
3
 
: ð24Þ
Contributions paid to the federal and the state policymakers are equal to:
ZIIn ¼ zIIn ¼ 4mα
2
1þmð Þ 1þ 9mð Þ2 : ð25ÞIf there is no lobbying, in the unique Nash equilibrium tax rates are:
T0
IIn= t0IIn=α/3.
Again, lobbying reduces taxation, with an impact that is stronger
the more concentrated is the market.
3.3. Lobbying with a single taxing authority
The outcomeof the lobby game in the case inwhich only one layer of
government (the state level) is granted the power to tax is a special case
of the sequential lobby game. Formally, the equilibrium is obtained by
setting T=0 into the solution of the second stage of the game described
in Subsection 3.1.
Proposition 3. If only one layer of government (the state level) is entitled
to tax and the association of producers lobbies the policy maker for tax
rates reductions, in the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
lobby game, the tax rate and the contribution paid to the policy maker
are equal to:
tI ¼ m−1
m
α
2
 
; zI ¼ α
2
4 1þmð Þm : ð26Þ
If there is no lobbying, the policy maker sets the revenue-maximizing
tax rate t0
I =α/2.
4. Comparisons
We ﬁrst examine the impact of lobbying on the payoffs of producers,
policy makers and consumers. Then we compare the three tax regimes.
4.1. Lobbying versus no lobbying
As for the producers that collectively act as the principal in the lobby
game, the mere fact of lobbying implies that they gain from doing so,
since otherwise they would choose not to lobby. As for policy makers,
who are the agents of the lobby game, it is immediate to see that they
are indifferent between a situation with lobbying and one without it
when there is a single taxing authority, whereas they gain from lobby-
ing when the tax base is shared between the two layers of government.
The explanation is thatwith a single taxing authority one principal faces
one agent; therefore, the reservation utility of the agent is equal to her
payoff in the absence of lobbying. Instead, when there are two taxing
authorities, because of the tax externality between the agents, the
offer made in equilibrium by the principal to each agent raises the res-
ervation utility of the other agent above the corresponding level in the
absence of lobbying, with the result that both policy makers gain from
lobbying.
Finally, we turn to consumers, which do not engage in lobbying ac-
tivities. As described in Subsection 2.2, consumers’ payoff is made up of
two components: the net consumers’ surplus (Eq. 11), inclusive of the
externality, and the lump sum transfer (Eq. 12). The latter is proportion-
al to policy makers’ payoff. Hence, as argued above, it is not affected by
lobbying under a single taxing authority whereas it increases with lob-
bying under tax-base overlapping. Lobbying by producers, by reducing
taxation and increasing consumption, bears instead an ambiguous im-
pact on the net surplus (Eq. 11), since both the ‘perceived’ surplus and
the externality increase. If the externality is weak (i.e., if the index ε is
small), then taxation by Leviathan policymakers is likely to be excessive
and therefore lobbying by producers for lower taxation may beneﬁt
consumers. In fact, it is possible to show that the reduction in taxation
induced by lobbying beneﬁts consumers, provided that the externality
index is below a given threshold level.
These ﬁndings, which are summarized in the following result,
characterize the conditions under which, in a given tax regime, tax
policy subjected to lobbying by producers Pareto dominates tax poli-
cy in the absence of lobbying.
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regimes. (ii) With a single taxing authority, the policy maker is indiffer-
ent between being lobbied and not being lobbied. With two taxing au-
thorities, policy makers at both layers of government strictly gain from
being lobbied. (iii) For each tax regime TR, TR∈ {I, IIs, IIn}, there exists
a threshold level, ~εTR, of the externality index, ε, such that under the re-
gime TR consumers are better off in the presence of lobbying by pro-
ducers than in its absence if and only if εb~εTR.
4.2. Comparison of tax regimes
By comparing the consolidated (federal plus state) equilibrium tax
rates derived in Propositions 1, 2 and 3, it is immediate to obtain the
following result.
Result 2. (i) Both in the presence and in the absence of lobbying by pro-
ducers, the equilibrium tax rate with a single taxing authority is lower
than the consolidated equilibrium tax rate with two taxing authorities.
(ii) When taxation is by both layers of government: (iia) in the absence
of lobbying the consolidated equilibrium tax rate is always higher under
sequential than under simultaneous tax setting; (iib) in the presence of
lobbying by producers, the ranking of the equilibrium consolidated tax
rates under sequential and simultaneous tax setting depends on market
structure: (T+ t)IIsb(T+ t)IIn if m=1, (T+ t)IIs>(T+ t)IIn if m≥2.
The intuition for these outcomes is the following. (i) Taxation by two
layers of government is always higher than taxation by a single layer be-
cause in the former tax regime policy makers ignore the vertical tax ex-
ternalities. (iia) In the absence of lobbying, taxation under sequential tax
setting is always higher than taxation under simultaneous tax setting be-
cause federal and state tax rates are strategic substitutes (the best re-
sponse functions are negatively sloped, see Eq. (A.1) in Appendix A).
Therefore, the Stackelberg leader has an incentive to set a tax rate
which is higher, while the follower has an incentive to set a tax rate
which is lower, than the symmetric-equilibrium tax rate of the simulta-
neous game, with a total effect that makes the consolidated tax rate
higher in the sequential than in the simultaneous game.25 (iib) The rank-
ing is reversed in the presence of lobbying, but only if the market is mo-
nopolized. The reason is that a lobby representing a monopolist is very
strong, in particular when the policy makers are lobbied sequentially.26
The next result shows how producers and policy makers score in
the three tax regimes.
Result 3. When producers lobby the policy makers: (i) the ranking of
tax regimes in terms of producers’ net proﬁts is I≻ IIn≻ IIs for all market
structures; (ii) the ranking in terms of policy makers’ aggregate (federal
plus state) payoffs is: IIs≻ IIn≻ I if m=1 or m=2, IIn≻ I≻ IIs if m=3,
I≻ IIn≻ IIs if m≥4; (iii) with a single taxing authority, the joint payoff
of producers and policy makers is maximized, whereas with two taxing
authorities it is not maximized.
Result 3(i) shows that producers always prefer to deal with a single
policymaker. And if they have todealwith twopolicymakers, they prefer
to lobby them simultaneously rather than sequentially. As for policy
makers, Result 3(ii) shows that the ranking depends onmarket structure.
If the market is highly concentrated, with nomore than three ﬁrms, then
the aggregate payoff of policy makers is highest under tax-base25 The opposite result would emerge were the federal and the state tax rates strategic
complements. This is the case, for instance, when the demand for the taxed good is iso-
elastic (Keen, 1998, p. 462).
26 To see this, one has to look at the pseudo best response functions under the inﬂu-
ence of lobbying, which are shown in Appendix A. With sequential lobbying (see
Eq. (A.3)), if the market is monopolized the state policy maker (the follower) sets
t=0 in response to any tax rate T set by the federal policy maker. Instead, with simul-
taneous lobbying (see Eq. (A.6)), the best response functions are positive and negative-
ly sloped also when the market is monopolized.overlapping. On the contrary, with more than three ﬁrms their payoff is
highest when only one layer of government is allowed to tax. Finally, Re-
sult 3(iii) shows that the dispersion of taxing powers reduces the rents
from lobbying activities. In fact, while the allocation under a single taxing
authority is efﬁcient in the sense of maximizing the joint payoff, r+Π, of
the principal and the agent, the allocation with two taxing authorities
falls short of joint efﬁciency because of the tax externalities between
the agents (a result that Segal, 1999, has shown to hold in more general
settings). To see this in the case of simultaneous lobbying, it is sufﬁcient
to look at the expression (23) for net proﬁts. The sum of the ﬁrst three
terms, Π+r+R, is equal to the joint payoff of the principal and the
agents. However, the maximization of the joint payoff is distorted by
the presence of the last two terms, R[T(t), t] and r[T, t(T)], that account
for the impact of tax externalities on the reservationutilities of the agents.
Similar considerations apply in the case of sequential lobbying.
Result 3 makes clear that there is no tax regime, in the presence of
lobbying, which is Pareto superior to the other tax regimes in all market
structures. Therefore, we make the ﬁnal comparison in terms of alloca-
tive efﬁciency. Recall, from Subsection 2.3, that the efﬁcient tax policy is
the one that implements the efﬁcient level of consumption of the
harmful good, which also corresponds to the maximization of total
surplus. Hence, tax regimes are ranked in terms of total surplus.
Result 4. There exists a threshold level, ε*, of the externality index, ε,
such that, subject to lobbying by producers, taxation by both layers of
government is more efﬁcient than taxation by a single layer of govern-
ment if and only if ε>ε*.
The intuition for this result comes directly from Result 2(i), which
shows that the consolidated tax rate is always higher with two taxing
authorities than with a single taxing authority. Since a relatively high
level of the externality implies a relatively high level of the efﬁcient con-
solidated tax rate deﬁned in Eq. (14), it turns out that when ε is greater
than a given threshold ε* the total surplus under taxation by two layers
of government is higher than the one under taxation by a single layer,
while the reverse holds true when εbε*.
5. A second group lobbying for high taxes
In this section we introduce another special interests group that, in
contrast with producers, aims at lobbying policy makers for high
taxes, since its goal is that of reducing the consumption externality as
much as possible. In many developed countries, there are associations
of citizens, non-proﬁt organizations, and other types of institutions,
that raise resources to fund programs or to promote public policies
against smoking or pollution of the environment. For brevity, we will
refer to this lobby group as the ‘green’ lobby, or the ‘environmentalists’.
Note that, like producers that aim at higher proﬁts, the green lobby is a
‘functionally specialized’ interests group in the way deﬁned by Aidt
(1998), since its task is to give voice to a single aspect of tax policy.
Let F≥0 and f≥0 be the contributions offered by the green lobby
to the federal and the state policy makers, respectively. Its objective
function is then given by:
e T; t; F; fð Þ ¼−δE T; tð Þ− F þ fð Þ; ð27Þ
where the externality E(.) is deﬁned in Eq. (10). The parameter δ∈[0, 1]
shows that the green lobby is ready to pay up to δ dollars of contribu-
tions in exchange for a unit reduction in the external cost. In contrast,
the objective function (5) of producers shows that they are ready to
pay up to one dollar of contributions for one dollar increase in gross
proﬁts. Two types of arguments can justify the asymmetry in the objec-
tive functions of the two lobby groups. While the group of producers is
relatively small, with members sharing similar interests (in our model,
identical interests, since ﬁrms are identical), the citizens joining the
green lobby generally form a vast group with heterogeneous interests
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to free ride. Therefore, while ﬁrms have strong incentives to join the
lobby that furthers their collective interests, citizens havemuchweaker
incentives to join the green lobby, with the result that only a fraction of
the population directly participates in the lobbying activity. As for the
second argument, note that while lower taxes bring ‘real’ cash to pro-
ducers in the formof higher proﬁts, higher taxes donot bring cash in cit-
izens’ pockets, but only non-monetary beneﬁts in terms of reduced
external costs. All in all, these arguments justify the introduction of
the parameter δ into the objective function (27), which implies that
the green lobby is ready to pay one dollar of contributions to policy
makers only if the external costs are reduced by at least 1/δ≥1 dollars.
In the presence of the two lobby groups, the objective functions
(6)–(7) of the federal and the state policy makers become: V(T, t, Z,
F)=R(T, t)+Z+F and v(T, t, z, f)=r(T, t)+z+ f, respectively.
We restrict the analysis to two institutional settings, one without,
and the other one with, tax-base overlapping. In the ﬁrst, producers
and environmentalists simultaneously lobby a single layer of govern-
ment (without loss of generality, the state level). In the second tax re-
gime, the two groups simultaneously lobby each policy maker in turn,
ﬁrst the federal and then the state level. The game with a single taxing
authority (a single agent), and two lobby groups (two principals),
takes the form of ‘common agency’, a class of games that have been ex-
tensively used to study lobbying activities by Grossman and Helpman
(1994, 2001) and Dixit et al. (1997), among others. The game with
twopolicymakers that are, in turn, simultaneously lobbied by two pres-
sure groups, takes instead the form of a sequential common agency.27
The structure of the lobby games with two pressure groups is sim-
ilar to that of the games with a single lobby. There is, however, a dif-
ference. While in the games of Section 3 the lobby of producers made
‘point’ offers to policy makers (i.e., a given contribution conditional
on a given tax rate), in the present games each lobby group presents
to the policy maker a menu of offers, that is a series of contributions,
each one associated to a given tax rate, from which the policy maker,
upon acceptance of the offer, can make the preferred choice. More
precisely, we assume that each lobby group presents to policy makers
truthful, or compensating, contribution functions, in the way deﬁned
by Dixit et al. (1997). A truthful contribution function is shaped
along an indifference curve of the lobby group, so that any given
change in the policy instrument brings about a corresponding change
in the contribution that is equal to the change in the payoff of the
lobby group. Truthful contributions have the property that the set of
the best responses of each principal to the contribution functions
(not necessarily truthful) of the other principals always contains a
truthful contribution schedule (Dixit et al., 1997, Proposition 2).
In order to ease the presentation of the results, the analysis that fol-
lows focuses on the special case of a monopoly market (m=1). While
the latter restriction is not crucial for the results derived below, when
necessary we point out any relevant modiﬁcation that occurs for
m>1. The details of the lobby games in the two tax regimes are worked
out in the proof of Proposition 4 below, contained in Appendices A and
B, which also shows that the solution of the games requires the intro-
duction of the following restriction on the parameters δ and ε.
Assumption 1. ε∈ [0, 1] and δ∈ [0, 1] are such that δε≤1/2.
The above restriction has a simple economic justiﬁcation. If δε>1/2,
then δ≥1/2 and ε≥1/2, with at least one strict inequality. Therefore,
both the externality index, ε, and the lobbying power of the27 The tax regimes we examine do not exhaust all possibilities. Among these, a prom-
inent case is the one in which the lobby groups simultaneously lobby the policy
makers, a class of games analyzed by Prat and Rustichini (2003). However, this type
of games does not admit, in general, simple solutions. Another alternative is the game
in which the lobby groups move in turn, each one lobbying sequentially or simulta-
neously the policy makers.environmentalists, δ, take large values. This implies, in the regime
with two taxing authorities, that in equilibrium the consolidated tax
rate is set at its maximum feasible level, t+T=α, with the result that
consumption is completely discouraged. By introducing Assumption 1,
we simply rule out such an unrealistic occurrence, except for the special
case in which δε=1/2.
We can now present the solutions of the tax setting games with
two lobby groups. The subscript ‘11’ denotes an equilibrium in
which both groups lobby the policy makers.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, if both layers of government are
allowed to tax, and if the pressure groups simultaneously lobby the pol-
icy makers, ﬁrst the federal and then the state, in the unique subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium of the lobby game, the federal and the state
tax rates are equal to, respectively:
TIIs11 ¼ 1þ δεð Þα=3; tIIs11 ¼ δεα:
The contributions paid to the federal and the state policy makers, re-
spectively by the producer and the environmentalists, are:
ZIIs11 ¼ 1−2δεð Þ2α2=72; zIIs11 ¼ 1−2δεð Þ2α2=18;
FIIs11 ¼ δεαð Þ2=6; f IIs11 ¼ δεαð Þ2=4:
If only one layer of government is entitled to tax (the state level), and
the pressure groups simultaneously lobby the policy maker, in the unique
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the lobby game, the tax rate and
the contributions are:
tI11 ¼ δεα; zI11 ¼ 1−δεð Þ2α2=8; f I11 ¼ δεαð Þ2=4:
For δ=0 (no lobbying by the environmentalists), the tax rates and
contributions shown in Proposition 4 collapse into those shown in
Propositions 1 and 3, for m=1 (monopoly market). Unsurprisingly,
the more powerful is the green lobby, that is, the greater is δ, the
higher are the equilibrium tax rates in both tax regimes. The rise in
taxes due to an increase in δ also induces the producer to reduce
the contributions paid to policy makers.
Most of the results derived in the one-lobby case apply also to the
two lobby case, with minor qualiﬁcations. For instance, taxation is
higher with two taxing authorities than with one. The latter result im-
plies thatwhile the producer prefers to dealwith a single taxing author-
ity, the green lobby prefers to dealwith two taxing authorities. The level
of the consumption externality determines which is the most efﬁcient
tax regime. With a single taxing authority, the joint payoff of the policy
maker and of the lobby groups is maximized (a standard result in com-
mon agency games; see Dixit et al., 1997, Proposition 4), whilewith two
taxing authorities the joint payoff is not maximized, because of vertical
tax externalities. Instead, the introduction of the second lobby group
crucially affects the way in which lobbying impacts on the payoffs of
the players, as it is summarized in the following result.
Result 5. When tax policy is inﬂuenced by two pressure groups with op-
posed interests, the monopolist and the environmentalists, policy makers
at all levels gain from being lobbied in both tax regimes, provided that
the compounded parameter δε is below a given threshold level. More-
over, for each tax regime there exists a threshold level of the compounded
parameter δε such that: (i) the producer gains from lobbying, while the
environmentalists lose, if δε is below the threshold; (ii) both the producer
and the environmentalists lose from lobbying if δε is above the threshold.
Policymakers are happy to dealwith two lobby groups that have op-
posed interests, the producer for low, and the environmentalists for
high, taxes, since this allows them to cash large contributions with
small changes in their policies. In fact, the gain that policymakers obtain
from being lobbied is larger the more balanced is the strength of the
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from lobbying, although for both of them to take part to lobbying is a
dominant strategy. If δε is below a given threshold, which means that
the environmentalists areweak compared to the producer, then the lat-
ter gains, while the former lose, from lobbying. Above the threshold,
both groups lose from lobbying (they are stuck in a prisoners’dilemma),
since they are alike powerful.28
By comparing Results 1(ii) and 5, we also see that, in the regime
with a single taxing authority, while the policy maker is indifferent
between being lobbied and not being lobbied by a single group, she
strictly gains from being lobbied by two groups. When both layers
of government are allowed to tax, in general policy makers at both
levels gain from being lobbied, whether by one or by two groups.
There is, however, an interesting exception to the latter result,
which is the following. When the green lobby is very powerful, the
policy maker that moves ﬁrst (the federal) may be hurt by lobbying.
The reason is that the ﬁrst-mover policy maker is the one that gives
up more tax revenue when a powerful green lobby drives taxation
on the decreasing side of the Laffer curve; moreover, high taxes re-
duce the contributions from the producer.6. Concluding remarks
The underlying presumption about tax-base sharing by different
layers of government in a federation is that taxation may be excessive
because of vertical tax externalities. And if the presumption is correct,
a natural implication is that the power to raise revenue should be
given only to one layer of government. In this paper, the issue has
been re-examined in the speciﬁc, but relevant, context of excise taxa-
tion, by allowing for the possibility that tax policy is inﬂuenced by the
lobbying activities of special interest groups. In the given setting, verti-
cal tax externalities are not necessarily a source of excessive taxation.
We have then derived the conditions underwhich lobbying determines
a Pareto improvement, or enhances efﬁciency, in the tax regimes of in-
terest. We have also characterized the conditions under which taxation
by two layers of government, subjected to lobbying, is more efﬁcient
than taxation by a single layer, and vice versa. Therefore, our main con-
clusion is that the issue of tax assignment should not be dealt without
taking political institutions into account, in particular the role that spe-
cial interest groups might play.Acknowledgments
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The maximization programs that are solved in the proofs of
Propositions 1–3 are all strictly concave, with a unique solution. Sec-
ond order conditions are thus omitted to save space.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof computes the various steps of the
game described in Subsection 3.1. Bymaximizing r(.) in Eq. (9) with re-
spect to t, and then solving for t, we obtain the best response function:
t Tð Þ ¼ α−Tð Þ=2: ðA:1Þ
By substituting t(T) from Eq. (A.1) into Eq. (9), the r.h.s. of in-
equality (15) is equal to:
r T; t Tð Þ½  ¼ m α−Tð Þ
2
4 1þmð Þ :
Hence Eq. (16) is equal to:
z T; tð Þ ¼ m α−T−2tð Þ
2
4 1þmð Þ : ðA:2Þ
By maximizing π(T, t, Z)=Π(T, t)−z(T, t)−Z with respect to t, we
get:
t Tð Þ ¼ m−1ð Þ α−Tð Þ= 2mð Þ; ðA:3Þ
so that
π T; t Tð Þ; Z  ¼ α−Tð Þ
2
4 1þmð Þ−Z: ðA:4Þ
By substituting t**(T) into Eq. (8) we obtain
R T; t Tð Þ  ¼ α−Tð ÞT=2;
and by maximizing the latter expression with respect to T we get
T**=α/2. Hence:
t T
  ¼ α=4; R T; t T   ¼ α2=8:
We can now compute Eq. (19) as equal to:
Z Tð Þ ¼ α−2Tð Þ2=8:
By substituting the latter expression into Eq. (A.4) and then maxi-
mizing the resulting expressionwith respect to T, we obtain the equilib-
rium tax rate TIIs shown in Eq. (21). By plugging TIIs into Eq. (A.3) we
obtain tIIs shown in Eq. (21). Finally, ZIIs is obtained by substituting
T=TIIs into Z(T), zIIs is obtained by substituting t= t**(T) into z(T, t)
and then by substituting T=TIIs into the resulting expression.
As for sequential tax setting in the absence of lobbying, by
substituting for t(T) from Eq. (A.1) into the federal revenue (8) and
then maximizing with respect to T we ﬁnd T0IIs=α/2. By substituting
for T0IIs into Eq. (A.1) we then ﬁnd t0IIs=α/4. ■
Proof of Proposition 2. By substituting the best response function t(T)
of the state policymaker, deﬁned in Eq. (A.1), and the analogous best re-
sponse of the federal policymaker, T(t)=(α−t)/2, respectively into Eqs.
Z(T, t)=R[T(t), t]−R(T, t) and z(T, t)=r[T, t(T)]−r(T, t), we obtain:
z T; tð Þ ¼ m α−T−2tð Þ
2
4 1þmð Þ ; Z T; tð Þ ¼
m α−2T−tð Þ2
4 1þmð Þ : ðA:5Þ
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maximizing the resulting expression with respect to T and t we get
the ﬁrst order conditions:
t ¼ 3m−1ð Þα−4mT
1þ 5m ; T ¼
3m−1ð Þα−4mt
1þ 5m ; ðA:6Þ
from which we get the equilibrium tax rates TIIn and tIIn shown in
Eq. (24). By substituting T=TIIn and t= tIIn into Eq. (A.5) we obtain
ZIIn and zIIn shown in Eq. (25).
As for simultaneous tax setting in the absence of lobbying, taking the
best response functions to form the equations system t=t(T), T=T(t),
and then solving for the tax rates, we get T0IIn=t0IIn=α/3. ■
Proof of Proposition 3. The solution with a single taxing authority is
obtained by setting T=0 into the solution of the second stage of the
sequential lobby game. Therefore, by setting T=0 into Eq. (A.3) we
get tI shown in Eq. (26). By setting T=0 and t= tI into Eq. (A.2) we
get zI shown in Eq. (26).
As for tax setting in the absence of lobbying, t0I =α/2 is obtained by
maximizing the revenue function (9) with respect to t for T=0. ■
We now sketch the proofs of Results 1–5 and of Proposition 4. The
complete proofs are in Appendix B.
Result 1. Gross proﬁts,Π, tax revenues, R and r, the net consumers’ sur-
plus, S, and the lump sum transfer, L, under the various tax regimes, with
and without lobbying, are computed by substituting the corresponding
equilibrium tax rates shown in Propositions 1–3 into Eqs. (4), (8), (9),
(11) and (12), respectively. Using the equilibrium contributions shown
in Propositions 1–3, we then compute net proﬁts, π=Π−(Z+z), and
tax revenues plus contributions, V=R+Z, v=r+z, in the presence of
lobbying. It is then a matter of algebra to see that, for all m≥1: (i)
πTR>Π0TR, TR∈{IIs, IIn, I}, (ii) vI=r0I , (iii) VTR>R0TR, vTR>r0TR, TR∈{IIs,
IIn}. By solving the inequality (S+L)TR>(S+L)0TR with respect to ε, we
ﬁnd that (S+L)TR>(S+L)0TR iff εb~εTR, TR∈{IIs, IIn, I}.
Result 2. By comparing the equilibrium tax rates shown in
Propositions 1–3, it is immediate to see that t0I b(T+t)0IInb(T+ t)0IIs for
all m≥1, tIb(T+ t)IIsb(T+ t)IIn if m=1, tIb(T+t)IInb(T+ t)IIs if m≥2.
Result 3. By computing the equilibrium net proﬁts under the various
tax regimes, we ﬁnd that πI>πIIn>πIIs for allm≥1. As for policy makers,
after computing the aggregate tax revenues plus contributions under the
three tax regimes, we ﬁnd that: (i) (V+v)IIs>(V+v)IIn>vI if m=1 or
m=2, (ii) (V+v)IIn>vI>(V+v)IIs if m=3, (iii) vI>(V+v)IIn>
(V+v)IIs ifm≥4. By comparing the joint payoff of producers and policy
makers, JI≡πI+x(r+z)I, JIIn≡πIIn+x(R+Z+r+z)IIn, JIIs≡πIIs+x(R+
Z+r+z)IIs, we ﬁnd that JI> JIIn , JI> JIIs, for all m≥1, x∈(0, 1).
Result 4. By substituting the corresponding equilibrium tax rates
shown in Propositions 1–3 into Eq. (3) for Q(T, t), and then substitut-
ing the resulting expression into Eq. (13) for Ω(Q), we compute the
equilibrium values of Ω in the three tax regimes, under lobbying,
ΩTR(ε, m). These functions are linearly decreasing in ε, for all
TR∈{IIs, IIn, I}. For m=1, it is (i) ΩI(ε, 1)>ΩIIs(ε, 1)>ΩIIn(ε, 1) for
0≤εbε*(1), (ii) ΩIIs(ε, 1)>ΩI(ε, 1) and ΩIIs(ε, 1)>ΩIIn(ε, 1) for
ε*(1)bεbε**(1), (iii) ΩIIn(ε, 1)>ΩIIs(ε, 1)>ΩI(ε, 1) for ε**(1)bε≤1.
For m≥2, it is (i) ΩI(ε, m)>ΩIIn(ε, m)>ΩIIs(ε, m) for 0≤εbε*(m),
(ii) ΩIIn(ε, m)>ΩI(ε, m) and ΩIIn(ε, m)>ΩIIs(ε, m) for ε*(m)bεb
ε**(m), (iii) ΩIIs(ε, m)>ΩIIn(ε, m)>ΩI(ε, m) for ε**(m)bε≤1.
Proposition 4. In stage I, the pressure groups lobby the federal policy
maker. In stage II, they lobby the state policy maker. The game is
solved backward.
Stage II The second round of lobbying evolves along two sub-stages.
In stage II.1, the lobby groups simultaneously offer atruthful contribution to the state policy maker: z t; π ; Tð Þ ¼
max 0;Π t; Tð Þ−πf g the producer, f(t, ē ;T)=max{0, −δE(t ;
T)−ē} the green lobby, where π and ē are scalars represent-
ing net payoffs. In stage II.2, the policy maker accepts or re-
jects the contributions and then sets the tax rate t that
maximizes her objective function, given the tax rate T of
the federal policy maker. The game is solved backward. It
turns out that in the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
the policy maker accepts the offers from the lobby groups.
Formally, in stage II.1 each lobby sets its net payoff subject
to the policy maker's participation constraint and condi-
tional on the strategy chosen by the other lobby. This
gives two best response functions, π e; Tð Þ for the monopo-
list, e π ; Tð Þ for the green lobby, from which a unique Nash
equilibrium in the net payoffs, π11 Tð Þ; e11 Tð Þ
 	
, is obtained.
In stage II.2, the policy maker sets t by maximizing
r T; tð Þ þ z t; π11 Tð Þ; T
 þ f t; e11 Tð Þ; T
 
. Let t11** be the solu-
tion. The equilibrium contributions are then equal to
z11 Tð Þ ¼ Π t11; T
 
−π11 Tð Þ, f11∗ ∗=−δE(t11** ;T)−ē11**(T). This
completes the description of stage II of the game. Note
that by setting T=0 into the above expressions, we obtain
the equilibrium in the case of a single taxing authority.
Stage I The ﬁrst stage of the game evolves in a similar manner as the
second one. In stage I.1, the lobby groups simultaneously
offer a truthful contribution to the federal policy maker:
Z T; πð Þ ¼ max 0; π11 Tð Þ−π
 	
the producer, F(T, ē)=max{0,
ē11**(T)−ē} the green lobby. Note that both lobbies play a
truthful strategy in stage I taking into account that both
groups will lobby in the subsequent stage II. In stage I.2, the
policy maker accepts or rejects the contributions and then
sets the tax rate T that maximizes her objective function.
Assumption 1 is introduced to rule out corner solutions
with t+T=α. The game is solved backward. The solutions
are those shown in the proposition.Result 5. Consider the case of a single taxing authority (the state
government). By plugging t11I from Proposition 4 into the revenue
function (9) we get r11I , the tax revenue subject to lobbying. The pol-
icy maker's payoff is then proportional (by the exogenous factor x) to
r11
I +z11I + f11I , with z11I and f11I deﬁned in Proposition 4. Tax revenue
in the absence of lobbying, r00I , is obtained by substituting the tax
rate t0I (see Proposition 3) into the revenue function (9). It is then im-
mediate to see that (r11I +z11I + f11I )−r00I >0 iff δε∈(0, 1/2]. Consider
now the case of two taxing authorities. Using the tax rates T11IIs and t11IIs
in Proposition 4, we compute the tax revenues under lobbying, R11IIs and
r11
IIs, from the functions (8) and (9), respectively. Using the contributions
shown in Proposition 4, we compute the payoffs of the federal and state
policy makers, R11IIs+Z11IIs+F11IIs and r11IIs+z11IIs+ f11IIs, respectively. Tax reve-
nues in the absence of lobbying, R00IIs and r00IIs, are obtained by substituting
the tax rates T0IIs and t0IIs (see Proposition 1) into the revenue functions
(8) and (9). We then get: (R11IIs+Z11IIs+F11IIs)−R00IIs>0 iff δε∈[0, 3/8),
(r11IIs+z11IIs+ f11IIs)−r00IIs>0 for all δε∈[0, 1/2]. As for the second part of
the Result, it is obtained by simply comparing, for each lobby group,
the net payoff in the presence of lobbying with that in its absence.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at doi:10.
1016/j.jpubeco.2011.11.003.
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